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Accounting Quality and Firm-level Capital Investment 
 
 
Abstract:  This study examines how accounting quality relates to firm-level capital 
investment efficiency. Our first hypothesis is that higher quality accounting enhances 
investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside 
suppliers of capital. Our second hypothesis is that this effect should be stronger in 
economies where financing is largely provided through arm’s-length transactions 
compared with countries where creditors supply more capital. Our results are consistent 
with these hypotheses both across and within countries.  They are robust to alternative 
econometric specifications, different measures of accounting quality and investment-cash 
flow sensitivity, and numerous control variables.   
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 1 
Accounting Quality and Firm-level Capital Investment 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 A significant body of prior literature examines relations between accounting 
quality and financial market characteristics, yet little prior research exists that analyzes 
the effects of accounting quality on investment.  Here, we examine how accounting 
quality relates to firm-level capital investment efficiency, a key determinant of economic 
productivity.  Our focus on investment in productive assets complements and extends 
findings on how accounting relates to public financial markets’ operating characteristics. 
For example, Bhattacharya et al. [2003] find that accounting opacity is associated with a 
higher cost of publicly traded equity capital across 34 countries. However, institutional 
features may be related to firm-level capital investment differently than to equity market 
operations. For instance, private financing from banks in Germany (e.g., Gorton and 
Schmid [2000]), keiretsu in Japan (e.g., Hoshi et al. [1991]), and families in East Asia 
(e.g., Claessens et al. [2000]) may obviate or alter the effects of institutional features 
from their operational roles in public equity markets. Hence, how accounting quality 
affects the efficiency of firm-level capital investments remains an open question of 
fundamental importance.  
 In the neoclassical setting, managers (i.e., firms) endowed with capital invest until 
the marginal return is zero, allowing for adjustment costs (e.g., Tobin [1969], Hayashi 
[1982]). In this baseline setting, we should not observe an association between internally 
generated cash flows and investment.  But several frictions contradict this efficient result. 
One is capital rationing, which is generated by information asymmetry between managers 
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and investors. Since at least Myers [1984], it has been shown that if managers can exploit 
private information to issue securities at inflated prices, investors rationally withhold 
capital.  A resulting reliance on internal funding increases the sensitivity of investments 
to cash. A second friction arises from agency problems, when managers pursue perquisite 
consumption and “empire building” rather than returning excess cash to investors (e.g., 
Jensen [1986], Blanchard et al. [1994]).1  This behavior also may increase the sensitivity 
of investments to cash flows but, in this case, the sensitivity is due to an excess of cash. 
 Certain institutional features may serve to mitigate these deviations from the 
optimal investment policy. For example, Rajan and Zingales [2000] observe that “to 
function properly, a financial system requires clear laws and rapid enforcement, an 
accounting and disclosure system that promotes transparency and a regulatory 
infrastructure that protects consumers and controls risk.” Transparent accounting should 
reduce both adverse selection (i.e., the tendency to issue securities at an inflated price) 
and moral hazard (i.e., perquisite consumption using assets in place) by improving 
contracting and monitoring. 2  Thus, higher quality accounting may serve to enhance 
investment efficiency by mitigating these frictions. 
 We examine this hypothesis by considering the effects of differences in 
accounting quality both at the country level and at the firm level within countries. To do 
so, we first estimate investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms from 34 countries. We 
then consider how the average investment-cash flow sensitivity across countries varies 
with accounting quality. We measure accounting quality using three proxies for earnings 
quality described by Bhattacharya et al. [2003], as well as a measure of accounting 
                                                 
1
 Note that the existence of the agency problem ex post may lead to rationing of capital ex ante. 
2
 See Healy and Palepu [2001] for a review. 
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timeliness from Bushman et al. [2004]. We also are careful to control for the confounding 
effects of other institutional features, such as disclosure quality (CIFAR index), legal 
origin, creditor and shareholder rights, judicial efficiency, and economic conditions (e.g., 
the degree of economic development). We find that higher accounting quality is 
associated with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. We also find that other 
institutional features, particularly creditor rights and disclosure quality, play a similar but 
incremental role. These results persist after allowing for the possibility that operating 
cash flows convey additional information about short-term profitability (e.g., Alti 
[2003]). 
 Having established that differences in accounting quality are associated with 
differences in the efficiency of capital investments across countries, we then examine 
how sources of financing (debt versus equity) affect this relation. A priori, we expect 
accounting quality to play a stronger role in economies where financing is largely 
provided through arm’s-length transactions, for example, where stock exchanges are the 
dominant sources of capital, since here, investment decisions rely more heavily on public 
accounting disclosures. On the other hand, in economies where creditors play a more 
dominant role, banks may be able to obtain information through private channels 
(mitigating adverse selection problems), and they may be in a better position to directly 
monitor managers once capital is supplied (mitigating moral hazard). Thus, in credit-
dominated economies, the quality of publicly disclosed accounting information should be 
less influential in decisions to supply capital than in public equity-dominated economies. 
Therefore, we should observe a smaller effect on capital investment decisions when 
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accounting quality is improved in credit-dominated economies than in public equity-
dominated economies.  
 We test this hypothesis in two ways. Initially, we regress cash flow sensitivity on 
accounting quality in our cross-country sample, partitioning observations in two groups 
based on the prevalence of public equity versus debt financing. We find that higher 
accounting quality is associated with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity in economies 
that depend more on public equity financing compared with those more reliant on debt 
financing.  Then, we examine the effect of accounting quality on investment efficiency at 
the firm level in two selected countries.  We do this for several reasons. First, it allows us 
to determine whether accounting quality operates similarly across and within countries.  
Second, it helps us to control for certain differences in characteristics across countries 
that could affect our cross-country results, such as correlations between accounting 
quality, legal origins, creditor rights and administrative efficiency. Finally, as explained 
below, this firm-level analysis allows us to address certain econometric issues.   
 In our within-country tests, we examine two polar cases – the US and Japan – for 
several reasons. First, they are the two largest economies in the world with abundant 
external financing available to firms. Second, they provide large and diversified firm 
samples with long time-series data that enable us to estimate firm-specific parameters 
with a reasonable level of confidence. Comparable datasets are generally not available for 
other countries. However, the US and Japan differ along one important dimension. Public 
equity capital plays a much more dominant role as a source of firm financing in the US 
than in Japan. Thus, we expect accounting quality to play a more important role in the 
largely arm’s-length transactions in the US.  On the other hand, Japanese suppliers of 
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capital, such as keiretsu and banks, have non-public sources of information and thus the 
quality of public accounting disclosures may be less relevant to their decisions to supply 
capital. Our results are consistent with these predictions. Accounting quality matters both 
statistically and economically in the US where higher quality accounting is associated 
with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, but we do not observe such a relation in 
Japan. 
 Our findings contribute in at least two ways to the existing literature. First, they 
provide empirical evidence that accounting and other institutional features relate to the 
economic fundamentals of firm-level capital investment efficiency. In particular, 
accounting quality is shown to reduce frictions in the investment process. We find that 
this effect exists both across countries and within countries, even in the most liquid 
capital market, the US. Second, our findings confirm that this effect is stronger in 
economies where public equity capital plays a greater role in capital investment financing 
compared with countries dominated by debt financing. This effect is observed in both our 
cross- and within-country tests.  
 We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews related research.  Section 3 develops 
our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our tests for relations between accounting quality and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity.  Section 5 presents our findings. Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Related Research 
 Economists have long studied how financial frictions affect investment decisions 
and economic growth.  This literature is too extensive to review comprehensively here, 
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though we discuss selected results in Section 4.1 below.3  More recently, scholars in 
accounting, finance and law have focused their attention on the effects of institutional 
features (such as legal structure or judicial enforcement) on market frictions and their 
consequences for capital investment. For example, Bhattacharya et al. [2003] have shown 
that the cost of publicly traded equity across 34 countries is related to three different 
measures of earnings transparency. Francis et al. [2005] provide international evidence 
that dependence on external financing creates incentives for firms to undertake higher 
levels of voluntary accounting disclosure. However, the implication of these findings for 
firm-level investment is not straightforward. If equity financing were the only source of 
capital, frictions in equity financing would probably lead to frictions in capital investing.  
However, firms can access multiple sources of financing. Thus, if one channel is 
inefficient (e.g., public equity financing), other sources such as debt, private financing, 
state subsidies, and intra-group capital transfers, for example, can substitute. In 
equilibrium, there may not be any differences in investment efficiency at the firm level, 
but simply cross-sectional differences in financing patterns. Consistent with this view, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic [2002] find no evidence that a country’s relative 
reliance on bank versus stock market financing affects firms’ access to external 
financing.   
 Other studies have considered relations between institutional features and capital 
investment at the industry level. For example, Wurgler [2000] measures cross-country 
capital allocation efficiency by industry-level elasticity of investment with respect to 
value added. He finds this measure to be positively related to the amount of firm-specific 
                                                 
3
 See also Hubbard [1998] for a review and representative studies by Bagehot [1873], King and Levine 
[1993], Rousseau and Wachtel [1998] and Beck, Levine and Loayza [2000]. 
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information available in domestic stock markets when measured by synchronicity, 
positively related to minority shareholder rights, and negatively related to state 
ownership. Rajan and Zingales [1998] show that industry growth is positively related to a 
financial development index. 
 Our paper advances the existing literature in several ways. First, instead of 
considering the effect of institutional features on industry growth (e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales [1998], Wurgler [2000]) or on financial market development (e.g., LaPorta et al. 
[1997], Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic [1998]), we focus on firm-level capital 
investment decisions.  Second, we concentrate on accounting quality, a feature not 
examined in many prior studies (e.g., LaPorta et al. [1997], Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic [1998], Wurgler [2000]).  In addition, we consider the differences both 
between countries and between firms within a country. Third, our tests do not limit 
capital market frictions to their effects on capital rationing exclusively (e.g., Fazzari et al. 
[1988]).  Rather, we allow accounting quality to reduce either the lack or excess of cash.  
Finally, given the possibility that different sources of capital may substitute for each 
other, we do not limit our attention to any specific financing channel (e.g., Bhattacharya 
et al. [2003]) and instead focus on capital investment behavior. 
3.  Hypothesis Development 
 Tobin [1969] theorizes that capital investment is a function of the ratio between 
the stock-market valuation of existing real capital assets and their current replacement 
cost.  Yoshikawa [1980], Hayashi [1982] and Abel [1983] reconcile this theory with the 
neoclassical interpretation.  In this framework, the marginal Q ratio, q, is the driver of 
capital investment policy. For example, Hayashi [1982] summarizes the model by stating, 
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“once q is known […], the firm can decide the optimal rate of investment though the 
knowledge of the installation function ψ alone.” He then proceeds to estimate this 
baseline model by regressing the investment rate on q. Fazzari et al. [1988] challenge this 
view and suggest that firms that are liquidity constrained (i.e., cannot externally finance 
their investments) need to rely more on their internally generated funds. 
 Hoshi et al. [1991] summarize two possible justifications for capital rationing. On 
the one hand, moral hazard models suggest that outside financing can dilute 
managements’ ownership stakes, thereby exacerbating incentive problems that arise when 
managers control the firm but do not own it. This ex post incentive problem reduces the 
amount of capital supplied ex ante. On the other hand, Myers and Majluf [1984] propose 
an adverse selection model. They suggest that if managers are better informed than 
investors about a firm’s prospects, they will try to sell overpriced securities. Rational 
investors will, in response, increase the cost of capital, thus decreasing the amount 
demanded. Therefore, in both cases, frictions operate to reduce the amount of external 
capital supplied to the firm. Firms that can generate cash internally are able to mitigate 
these effects, which causes capital investment to be correlated with the availability of 
internally generated funds. 
 There is presently a debate (see, for example, Fazzari et al. [2000] and Kaplan and 
Zingales [1997, 2000]) as to whether higher investment-cash flow sensitivity necessarily 
implies that firms are more financially constrained. In this paper, we remain agnostic on 
this issue since the problem may not be a lack, but rather an excess of cash. Capital 
investment can be correlated with internally generated funds simply because managers do 
not return to investors excess cash coming from rents (and quasi rents) and other assets in 
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place. Casual empiricism suggests the existence of such overinvestment by managers and 
several theoretical explanations have been proposed. For example, Jensen [1986] 
suggests that managers have incentives to grow their firms beyond their optimal size.4  
Whereas external financing subjects managers to monitoring and disciplining by capital 
providers, “financing projects internally avoids this monitoring and the possibility the 
funds will be unavailable,” thereby allowing managers to overinvest. Blanchard et al. 
[1994] provide empirical support for this view. They consider what managers do when 
they receive a cash windfall that does not change the investment opportunity set (i.e., 
Tobin’s Q). In perfect financial markets, managers should return the money to the capital 
suppliers. Contrary to this expectation, Blanchard et al. [1994] find that managers tend to 
invest in unrelated projects that typically fail. 
 Notice that all of these imperfections are predicated by the existence of 
information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. If managers 
could commit to revealing all of their private information, outsiders would not ration 
capital for fear of buying at an inflated price. Similarly, if higher quality accounting 
permitted perfect monitoring, no agency problem would arise (see, for example, Antle 
and Eppen [1985] for a formal model of this idea). We would then be back to the baseline 
neoclassical model and internally generated cash flows would play no role in investment 
decisions. Our main hypothesis is predicated on this idea: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher quality accounting reduces the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity at the firm level. 
                                                 
4
 For simplicity, we use “empire building” as our main way to motivate overinvestment. However, there are 
other models leading to a similar pattern such as overconfidence (e.g., Heaton [2002]), the “quiet life” 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan [2003]) and reputation (e.g., Baker [2000]). 
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 We further predict, based on the reasoning above, that this effect should be 
stronger in economies where financing is largely provided through arm’s-length 
transactions, for example, where the stock market is the dominant source of capital. On 
the other hand, in economies where creditors play a central role in financing, banks may 
be able to obtain information through alternate private channels (and thus mitigate 
adverse selection problems). They also may be in a better position to monitor the 
managers directly once the capital has been supplied (and thus mitigate the moral 
hazard).  In this case, accounting quality should be less relevant to their decisions to 
supply capital and, as a result, we should observe a smaller effect of accounting quality 
on investment efficiency in credit-based economies.  his leads to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher quality accounting reduces the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity more in economies dominated by stock markets than in 
those dominated by creditors. 
Notice that we do not form any prediction as to whether one type of economy is better 
than the other in mitigating frictions in the investment process. 
4. Cash flow sensitivity: Empirical setting 
4.1. Overall approach. 
 We employ both cross- and within-country tests, each with its own advantages.  
In the cross-country tests, average investment-cash flow sensitivities are estimated by 
country using firm-level data and then regressed on accounting quality and other 
variables of interest. This testing approach is likely to enhance the power of our tests by 
increasing both the cross-sectional variation and the magnitudes of financial frictions. It 
also enables us to consider the effects of institutional factors, such as creditor rights and 
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legal origin, which cannot be easily studied in a single-country setting. As observed by 
Francis et al. [2005], “the United States is generally viewed as having a frictionless 
financial market with relatively easy access to external financing, and therefore it is not 
clear if U.S. findings necessarily generalize to countries with different financial or legal 
systems.” 
 However, the cross-country approach also has some limitations. First, it is 
difficult to obtain sufficient time series data from multiple countries to estimate firm-
specific parameters. Second, different institutional settings and accounting rules make it 
difficult to compare firm-based measures across countries. For example, since asset 
revaluation is permitted in some countries but not in others, plant, property and 
equipment and depreciation measures convey different meanings. To address these issues 
and to provide corroborating evidence that the hypothesized effect of accounting quality 
on investment efficiency operates within as well as across counties, we further examine 
two contrasting countries: the US and Japan.  Both countries have large economies with 
ample sources of external financing. However, in the US, stock markets play a central 
role in providing capital, while in Japan, keiredtsu and banks are the major source of 
capital.  As documented by Wurgler [2000], the ratio of stock market value to total credit 
market value is 0.64 for the US but only 0.15 in Japan. Our focus on the US and Japan 
allows us to assess whether the dominant form of financing influences the effect of 
accounting quality on investment decisions.  
4.2. Samples and data  
 To enhance comparability with prior research, we utilize data from the same set of 
34 countries examined by Bhattacharya et al. [2003]. For our cross-country tests, 
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accounting and financial data are obtained from Compustat Global Vantage for the entire 
coverage period of the database (1993 to 2004). Accounting and financial data for the 
within-country tests are obtained for the US from COMPUSTAT and for Japan from the 
PACAP database (1975 to 2001).  he longer time series for the within-country samples 
allow us to estimate firm-specific parameters and utilize them in panel specifications.  
We focus on industrial firms and, as is customary, exclude utilities and firms in the 
financial, real estate, insurance and public administration sectors.5  Our resulting sample 
includes only publicly traded companies with access to public sources of capital. As these 
firms also can potentially access alternate sources of capital including bank loans, 
governmental financing and private equity when public markets are inadequate, this 
provides a lower bound for the effects of accounting quality and other institutional 
features. Private firms with lesser access to capital and weaker outside monitoring would 
benefit relatively more from enhanced institutional features than would firms with more 
access to capital and stronger outside monitoring. 
4.3 Proxies for accounting quality. 
 For our cross-country tests, we use four country-specific measures of accounting 
quality. Three of these measures are adapted from Bhattacharya et al. [2003] and a fourth 
from Bushman et al. [2004].  Earnings aggressiveness is based on the converse of 
conservatism as defined by Ball et al. [2000]. Following Ball et al. [2000] and 
Bhattacharya et al. [2003], we expect countries with more aggressive accounting 
practices to exhibit lower firm-level capital investment efficiency than countries with less 
aggressive accounting practices. Loss avoidance is the ratio of the number of firms with 
                                                 
5
 We focus on industrial and commercial companies and, following prior studies, exclude US firms with 
SIC codes between 4900-4999, 6000-6999 and above 9000, and those trading as American Depository 
Receipts. We exclude Japanese firms with INDID codes starting with 05, 06 and 08. 
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small positive earnings minus the number of firms with small negative earnings divided 
by the sum of the two.  This proxy is derived from Burgstahler and Dichev [1997] and 
Degeorge et al. [1999] who employ a similar measure for US firms. Following 
Bhattacharya et al. [2003], we expect countries with greater loss avoidance to exhibit 
lower capital investment efficiency than countries with less loss avoidance. Earnings 
smoothing is based on the cross-sectional correlation between the change in accruals and 
the change in cash flows scaled by lagged total assets. Following Leuz et al. [2003] and 
Bhattacharya et al. [2003], we expect countries with a greater degree of earnings 
management to exhibit lower capital investment efficiency than countries with a smaller 
degree of earnings management. Following Bushman et al. [2004], Timeliness is based on 
the average ranking of “answers to the following interim reporting questions: frequency 
of reporting, count of disclosed items, and consolidation of interim reports.” We expect 
countries with timelier reporting to exhibit higher capital investment efficiency than 
countries without timely reporting. Because we are agnostic regarding which dimension 
of accounting quality plays a more significant role, we aggregate the four accounting 
quality measures into a summary index (AQ).  In order to combine them meaningfully, 
we first form binary specifications. We do so by creating four binary variables for 
earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, earnings smoothing and timeliness based on 
whether they have a better value than the median value in the cross-country sample. We 
then create AQ by summing up these four binary variables. Combining the four measures 
into an index has the advantage of reducing the effects of measurement errors in the 
individual accounting quality measures. This index also is more comparable with the 
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index variables for creditor and shareholder rights developed by LaPorta et al. [1997] 
introduced as control variables below.6 
 In our within-country tests for the US and Japan, we employ firm-specific 
accounting quality measures, AQFS, reflecting the uncertainty in accruals following 
Dechow and Dichev [2002]. Francis et al. [2005] find that this measure of accounting 
quality is the most closely associated with their measure of the cost of capital. In Dechow 
and Dichev [2002], accruals quality is measured by the extent to which working capital 
accruals explain current-period, prior-period and future-period operating cash flow 
realizations. The unexplained portion of the variation in working capital accruals is an 
inverse measure of accruals quality (with a larger unexplained portion implying lower 
quality accounting). Details of the estimation procedure are provided in the appendix.  
We predict that higher quality accruals will be associated with higher capital investment 
efficiency especially in countries that rely on capital provided through arms-length 
transactions. 
4.4. Proxies for investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
 We use two different but comparable procedures to measure investment-cash flow 
sensitivity in the cross-country and within-country tests. In the cross-country tests, we 
mirror the prior literature (e.g., Fazzari et al. [1988], Hoshi et al. [1991]) by estimating 
investment-cash flow sensitivities after controlling for investment opportunities using 
Tobin’s Q (proxied by the market-to-book equity ratio, MTB). Given the heterogeneity of 
our cross-country sample, outliers could induce non-linear relations. A standard approach 
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 AQ takes values between 0 and 4.  Below, we also control for financial disclosure as measured by an 
index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The CIFAR index 
can potentially take values between zero and one hundred. To make AQ and CIFAR more comparable, we 
also normalize CIFAR by forming a variable that takes a value between zero and four based on quintiles of 
the distribution of CIFAR. Our results (untabulated) are not affected by this transformation. 
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to alleviating this problem is to take the log of the variables, which we apply to market-
to-book ratios. However, operating cash flows and investments often have negative 
values for which a log transformation is not defined. For them, we use an arctangent 
transformation that in effect “logs negative values.”7 The following model is estimated 
(using firm fixed effects) for each country: 
 Ii,t / Ki,t-1  =  βi0 + β1 OCFi,t / Ki,t-1 + β2 MTBi,t + εi,t (1) 
where Ii,t / Ki,t-1 is capital investment scaled by the beginning-of-period capital for 
firm i in period t, OCFi,t is the operating cash flow, β1 is our measure of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, εi,t is a normally distributed error term with a 
mean of zero, and it represents usual idiosyncratic errors. 
 This specification has two appealing features. First, it does not require a long time 
series for each firm to estimate the parameters, which allows us to use pooled cross-
sectional data to estimate an average investment-cash flow sensitivity for each country.  
This feature is important because Compustat Global Vantage contains a maximum of 
only 11 years of data. Second, this specification has been extensively used in the prior 
literature.  However, it relies on MTB to proxy for Q. To the extent that MTB does not 
fully capture investment opportunities, cash flows may pick up measurement errors that 
are correlated across countries with accounting quality. 
 We address this concern in several ways.  In our cross-country tests, we include 
future cash flows (Alti [2003]) and we use an instrumental variables approach in some 
specifications.  In our within-country tests, we use two databases, COMPUSTAT for the 
                                                 
7
 The arctangent function is approximately linear over the range [-1;1].  In cases where the absolute value 
of investment or cash flows is less than net fixed assets, the data are changed little by the transformation.  
However, when the absolute values of these scaled variables increase beyond 1, the transformed value is 
bounded by pi/2.  This transformation provides a convenient way of winsorising the data. 
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US and PACAP for Japan, which provide longer time series. This allows us to use an 
alternate test that does not rely on estimating Q. By doing so, we have a natural 
robustness check for our cross-country estimations.  We proxy for cash flow sensitivity of 
investment (CFSI) using the measure recently proposed by Hovakimian and Hovakimian 
[2005].  CFSI0 is measured as the difference between the cash-flow-weighted time-series 
average investment (CFWAI) of a firm and its un-weighted arithmetic time-series average 
investment (AI): 
 CFSI0,i,t = CFWAI0,i,t - AIi,t =1/n Σs=1t [ (CFi,s / (Σs=1t CFi,s)) * Ii,s] - 1/n Σs=1t Ii,s (2) 
where CF is a firm’s cash flow, I is the firm’s investments (where both are scaled 
by beginning-of-period net capital), and n is the number of annual observations 
for firm i.8 
 The intuition behind this specification is that there should be no systematic 
difference between the weighted and un-weighted average investments for firms whose 
investment decisions are not affected by their available cash flows. On the other hand, the 
value of CFSI should be higher for firms that tend to invest more in years with relatively 
high cash flows and less in years with relatively low cash flows. Unlike the measure of 
cash flow sensitivity in Equation (1), we do not have to estimate a regression coefficient 
and, therefore, we can avoid the associated econometric estimation issues. 
4.5. Estimation procedures 
 Our cross-country tests regress the 34 investment-cash flow sensitivities from 
Equation (1) on our measure of accounting quality, other institutional features (disclosure 
quality, creditor rights, shareholder rights, judicial efficiency and legal origin), and 
                                                 
8
 Variable definitions are detailed in the Appendix. 
 17 
control variables such as the gross domestic product (GDP), the average tangibility of 
firm assets, and firm size, which are all standard in the literature (see Appendix for 
variable definitions and estimation details). In the US within-country tests, we also 
control for auditing quality and analyst coverage as well as other control variables 
suggested by Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2005] and described in the Appendix. In 
both the US and Japan within-country tests, accounting quality, investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and control variables are estimated using ten-year rolling windows. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and for clustering of observations by firm. 
5.  Cash flow sensitivity: Empirical results. 
5.1. Cash flow sensitivities and between countries differences 
 Table 1 presents correlations among variables examined in the cross-country tests.  
Most correlations are reasonably small, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
significant concern. In particular, the correlation between AQ and CIFAR is only 0.13, 
suggesting that these two variables capture two related but differing constructs.  
However, shareholder rights (SR) is highly correlated with both AQ and CIFAR, as is 
legal origin (LO) with AQ, CIFAR, SR, and CR.  We take these high correlations into 
consideration in our later tests. 
 Table 2 presents tests of our first hypothesis by regressing investment-cash flow 
sensitivities at the country level from Equation (1) on accounting quality (AQ) and other 
variables as described above.  We report several specifications. In column 1, we enter 
only AQ.  In columns 2 and 3, we control for other institutional features. Column 2 
excludes LO, out of the concern that this variable is highly correlated with several other 
features. Finally, column 4 introduces controls for economy-wide factors. Results are 
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consistent with our predictions.  They indicate significant negative relations between AQ 
and the cash flow sensitivity of investment. When we turn our attention to the other 
institutional features (CIFAR, JE, CR, SR, and LO), we see that while most are associated 
with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, only CIFAR and CR are consistently 
significant at conventional levels.  This may be explained by a lack of power due to small 
sample size and it is not entirely unexpected given related findings in prior studies (e.g., 
DeFond and Hung [2004], Bushman et al. [2004]). 9  Among the economic control 
variables, size has the strongest effect. Our results also appear to be economically 
significant, with the specification including all institutional factors (column 5) explaining 
44 percent of the variation across countries in investment-cash flow sensitivity. AQ alone 
explains 14 percent of the variation (column 1). 
 As a robustness check, we also employ a “direct” estimation procedure that 
examines firm-year observations (untabulated). Specifically, we interact AQ with OCF in 
Equation (1) (we also include AQ in this specification). An advantage of this approach is 
that countries with larger economies comprise a larger share of the sample, so our sample 
is more representative of real economic activity. To prevent bias from measurement 
errors in Tobin’s Q from driving our results, we estimate the model using a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) procedure, whereby MTBi,t is instrumented by MTBi,t-2 and Kinti,t-3, 
lagged two and three periods, respectively, where Kint is the capital intensity defined as 
the ratio of net fixed assets to sales.  Specification tests indicate that our instruments are 
both relevant and valid. We also apply ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques to ensure 
that our results do not hinge on a particular 2SLS specification. Standard errors in our 
                                                 
9
 DeFond and Hung [2004] report that international variations in shareholder rights do not affect CEO 
turnover.  Bushman et al. [2004] find no relation between legal origin and their measure of financial 
transparency. 
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pooled 2SLS specifications are adjusted for unspecified heteroskedasticity and serial-
correlation using a two-step efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator 
(Hayashi [2000]).10 Results are consistent with our results from the indirect specification.  
The z- (or t-) statistics range from -3.81 to -9.98 for the interaction between cash flows 
and our accounting quality index, and from -4.71 to -13.08 for the interaction with 
CIFAR.  As expected, the z-(or t-) statistics are positive and range from 8.37 to 28.13 for 
cash flows. Finally, Alti [2003] suggests that there could be cash flow sensitivity even in 
an economy without frictions, because contemporaneous cash flows may better reflect 
information about short-term profitability than would the market-to-book equity ratio 
(MTB).  To control for this possible effect, we add operating cash flow (OCF) at time t+1 
and t+2 (scaled by fixed assets) or the difference in operating cash flows.  Although this 
specification reduces the sample size (since we need two future years to estimate future 
profitability), results are qualitatively similar. Thus, our cross-country tests support the 
first hypothesis that higher-quality accounting reduces investment-cash flow sensitivity at 
the firm level. 
 Our second hypothesis predicts that higher quality accounting should reduce 
investment-cash flow sensitivity more in economies dominated by stock markets than in 
those dominated by creditors. To test this prediction, we partition our cross-country 
sample based on whether the ratio of stock market value to credit market value in the 
country is above or below the median in the sample. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
accounting quality is statistically significant in the sub-sample of equity-based economies 
                                                 
10
 Alternatively, we remove the year dummies and allow for clustering of observations by year to control 
for cross-correlation in the error term.  Untabulated results are qualitatively similar. 
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(the t-statistic equals -2.06) but less than significant at conventional levels in the credit-
based economies (the t-statistic equals -1.25).11 
5.2. Cash flow sensitivities and within-country differences: the US 
Results for the US within-country tests reported in Table 3 are consistent with those for 
the international cross-sectional tests above. Column 1 reports the results for our panel 
specification where CFSI0 is the dependent variable and AQFS is the only independent 
variable. In column 2, we introduce the set of control variables described above and in 
the Appendix. In column 3, following Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2005], we transform 
CFSI0 into a binary variable that takes the value of one if CFSI0 is greater than 0.05 and 
zero otherwise, then use a logit specification with firm fixed effects to estimate the 
coefficients. All of the specifications consistently indicate that AQFS is associated with a 
reduction in the investment-cash flow sensitivity. This result is economically significant – 
an increase of AQFS by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of 30 percent in the 
average cash flow sensitivity.12  Thus, higher accounting quality is associated with higher 
investment efficiency even in the most liquid market in the presence of predominant 
public equity financing. Our results (untabulated) also hold under alternate specifications, 
for example, when we use boot-strapped standard errors, add year dummies, use 
observations from the last year only, control for the analyst coverage, and measure CFSI0 
using cash flows lagged by one year. Auditing quality (BigSix) and analyst coverage 
(AnalCov) are significantly negative in (untabulated) univariate regressions but these 
                                                 
11
 The magnitudes of the coefficients also are different (-0.15 for the equity-based sample and -0.09 for the 
credit-based sample). The small sample size prevents us from testing if these coefficient estimates differ 
significantly; pooling the two samples is also not feasible because of the high collinearity between the 
variable of interest in such a pooled sample. One should not necessarily conclude that accounting quality 
plays no role in credit-based economies for the same reason. 
12
 We obtain this estimate by multiplying the value of the coefficient (1.62) by one standard deviation of 
AQFS (0.014) and then dividing by the average CFSI0 (0.076). 
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variables become insignificant in some multivariate specifications. The other control 
variables generally have the expected signs and are generally consistent with Hovakimian 
and Hovakimian [2005]. For example, we would expect that larger, more profitable and 
more stable firms would be more transparent (see, among others, Lang and Lundholm 
[1993]). Hence, these firms should exhibit less investment-cash flow sensitivity than 
small and unprofitable and unstable firms. Consistent with these expectations, the 
coefficients on Size, ROA, Z-score, and CFO are negative, as expected, while the 
coefficients on σ(CFO) and M2B are positive.   
5.3. Cash flow sensitivities and within-country differences: Japan 
 Untabulated results for the Japan within-country tests indicate that, contrary to the 
US results, there is no statistically significant negative relation between accounting 
quality and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Although the Japanese sample size is 
smaller than the US sample size (approximately 15,000 observations versus 30,000 for 
the US), it is still sufficiently large to rule out statistical power as an explanation. This 
lack of statistical significance is consistent with our second hypothesis that accounting 
quality should have a smaller effect on investment efficiency in countries where bank 
financing and keiretsu are important sources of capital than in countries where equity is a 
dominant source of capital, because capital suppliers in credit-based economies have 
alternative avenues for reducing information asymmetry.13  
                                                 
13
 The mean and the standard deviation of the winsorized investment-cash flow sensitivity estimates are 
0.03 and 0.13, respectively, for Japanese firms versus 0.07 and 0.20, respectively, for US firms.  This 
suggests that homogeneity does not explain the Japanese results. 
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7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 This study examines how accounting quality relates to firm-level capital 
investment efficiency. We consider several measures of accounting quality derived from 
prior research and two different methods for estimating investment-cash flow 
sensitivities.  Our first hypothesis captures the intuition that higher quality accounting 
should enhance investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between 
managers and outside suppliers of capital. As argued in prior studies, information 
asymmetry can generate liquidity constraints (for example, as investors ration capital to 
protect themselves against adverse selection) or excess cash (for example, when it is 
difficult for owner-principals to monitor spending by manager-agents). Both situations 
generate inefficiencies in the investment process that accounting quality should mitigate.  
Our test results are consistent with this prediction both across and within countries under 
numerous alternative specifications. We find that the link between internally generated 
cash flows and investment is weaker when accounting quality is high. However, our tests 
do not address whether higher quality accounting operates primarily to mitigate the effect 
of a lack of cash or of its excess. This is a question we leave to future research.   
 Our second hypothesis is that the effect of higher quality accounting on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity should be stronger in economies where financing is 
largely provided through arm’s length transactions, for example, where stock markets are 
dominant sources of capital. In contrast, in countries where creditors provide more 
capital, banks may be able to obtain information through alternative private channels and 
may be better positioned to monitor managers directly once capital is supplied. Thus, we 
predict a stronger (weaker) relation between accounting quality and capital investment 
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efficiency in countries with predominant equity (bank) financing of firm-level capital 
investment.  Our test results support this second hypothesis both across and within 
countries. Overall, our findings lend support to the argument that accounting quality is an 
institutional feature available to policy makers that enhances investment efficiency by 
mitigating investment-cash flow sensitivity, and that this effect is stronger under 
conditions where capital is provided through arms-length transactions. 
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Appendix:  Details of Variable Estimation 
 
1) Accounting quality. 
 Cross-country sample  
 We create AQ by summing binary measures of four variables adapted from 
Bhattacharya et al. [2003] and Bushman et al. [2004] as described in Section 4.3 above. 
 US sample 
 We first estimate the following model: 
TCA1j,t = ϕ0,j + ϕ1,j CFOj,t-1 + ϕ2,j CFOj,t + ϕ3,j CFOj,t+1 + uj,t 
where TCAj,t = ∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – ∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t = total current accruals in year t, 
CFOj,t = NIBEj,t – TAj,t = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t, NIBEj,t = firm j’s net 
income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t, TAj,t = (∆CAj,t – ∆CLj,t – 
∆Cashj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t – DEPNj,t) = firm j’s total accruals in year t, ∆CAj,t = firm j’s 
change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and year t, ∆CLj,t = firm j’s 
change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t, ∆Cashj,t = firm 
j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t, ∆STDEBTj,t = firm j’s 
change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t-1 and year t, DEPNj,t 
= firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t.  We multiply 
the variance by minus one, so that a higher value of AQ corresponds to higher accounting 
quality. 
 In addition, we follow Francis et al. [2005] and use the model modified to include 
plant, property and equipment (PPE) and change in revenues (scaled by average assets). 
McNichols [2002] proposes this extension, arguing that the change in sales revenue and 
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PPE are important in forming expectations about current accruals, over and above the 
effects of operating cash flows. She shows that adding these variables to the cross-
sectional Dechow and Dichev [2002] regression significantly increases its explanatory 
power, thus reducing measurement error. However, the drawback of using this 
specification for our purpose is that it may include a mechanical link with our right-hand 
side variables by including capital investment in the regression.  As a robustness check, 
we estimate a second model: 
TCA2j,t = ψ0,j + ψ1,j CFOj,t-1 + ψ2,j CFOj,t + ψ3,j CFOj,t+1 + ψ4,j ∆Revj,t + ψ5,j PPEj,t + ηj,t 
where ∆Revj,t = firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t-1 and year t, 
PPEj,t = firm j’s gross value of PPE (Compustat #7) in year t. To conserve space, we only 
tabulate the results from the first specification but results are very similar when we use 
the second one.   
 Japanese sample 
 We follow a similar approach in our Japanese sample. Specifically, we use the 
following items from PACAP:  INC9 and INC8 for NIBE; BAL6 for CA; BAL13 for CL; 
BAL1 for Cash; JAF34 for STDEBT; JAF74 for DEPN; INC1 for Rev; and the sum of 
JAF16, JAF17, JAF18, JAF19, JAF20 and JAF21 for PPE. 
2) Variable I for cash flow sensitivities. 
Cross-country sample  
 To calculate investment-cash flow sensitivities in the cross-country sample, we 
estimate the following model: 
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 Ii,t/Ki,t-1 = βi0 + β1 OCFi,t /Ki,t-1 + β2 MTBi,t + εi,t 
where Ii,t is the investment in fixed assets for firm i in year t, defined as the change in net 
fixed assets (Global Vantage data76) plus depreciation expense (data11).  Ki,t-1 is the total 
fixed assets for firm i in year t-1.  MTBi,t,, our proxy for the Q ratio, is measured as the 
ratio of the sum of the market value of equity (data13 multiplied by data3) and the book 
value of debt divided (data106, data136 and data137 minus data138 and data139) by the 
book value of total asset (data89). One advantage of using the (quasi) market value of 
assets instead of their book value is that we do not drop from our sample firms with a 
negative equity book value. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Hoshi et al. [1991]), Q 
is calculated at the beginning of the period. Following previous studies, 14  OCFi,t is 
calculated as the sum of net income (data32) and depreciation expense (data11).   
 US Sample 
 To calculate the cash flow sensitivity in our within-country samples, we estimate 
the model proposed by Hovakimian and Hovakimian [1985]: 
 CFSI0,i,t = CFWAI0,i,t - AIi,t  
   =1/n Σs=1t [ (CFi,s / (Σs=1t CFi,s)) * Ii,s] - 1/n Σs=1t Ii,s 
where n is the number of annual observations for firm i and t indicates the time period.  I 
denotes investment, defined as capital expenditures (Compustat Item 128) divided by the 
beginning-of-period net capital.  CF denotes cash flow and is defined as the sum of the 
income before extraordinary items (Compustat Item 18) and depreciation and 
                                                 
14
 See, among others, Morck et al. [1990], Hoshi et al. [1991], Whited [1992], Kaplan and Zingales [1997, 
2000], Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2005].  We purposely do not correct our estimates of cash flows for 
any “working capital” effect for two reasons.  First, we want to be consistent with prior literature on cash 
flow sensitivity of investment.  Second, some firms lack the relevant information in our international 
database; thus, correcting our estimates of cash flows would introduce a selection bias.  Our approach also 
has been used in prior international studies (e.g., Ball et al. [2000]). 
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amortization (Item 14), divided by the beginning-of-period net capital (Item 8). As an 
untabulated robustness check, we also consider a cash flow measure from Bushman et al. 
[2005] that excludes working capital accruals. Our results still hold. To avoid negative 
and extreme weighted values, we follow Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2005] and set the 
negative cash flows to zero. The variable is estimated using a ten-year rolling window.  
This specification does not require the estimation of Q. By doing so, we have a natural 
robustness check for the efficiency of our various statistical corrections in our cross-
country sample. 
 In addition, since investment and cash flow are measured over an annual period, 
their exact timings may not coincide.  In order to account for the possibility that 
investment may be financed with cash flows from the previous fiscal year, we also 
estimate CFSI based on OCF, which is lagged relative to investment: 
CFSI
-1,i,t = CFWAI-1,i,t - AIi,t  
    = 1/n Σs=1t [ (CFi,s-1 / (Σs=1t CFi,s-1)) * Ii,s] - 1/n Σs=1t Ii,s 
Results (untabulated) are not affected by using this alternative definition. 
 Japanese sample 
 We follow a similar approach in our Japanese sample. Specifically, we use the 
following items from PACAP: change in PPE plus JAF74 scaled by beginning period 
PPE for I and NIBE plus JAF74, divided by the beginning-of-period net PPE for CF.   
3) Control variables in the cash flow sensitivity regressions. 
 Cross-country sample  
The institutional feature of primary interest is accounting quality, but we also 
consider financial disclosure, creditor rights (CR), shareholder rights (SR), judicial 
 34 
efficiency (JE) and legal origin (LO). As in many previous studies (e.g., Battacharya et 
al. [2003]), we measure financial disclosure quality using an index created by the Center 
for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). CR and SR are based on the 
summary measures of creditor rights (Cr5) and shareholder rights (Sr8) obtained from La 
Porta et al. [1997]. Our measure of judicial efficiency, JE, is the sum of the five proxies 
for judicial efficiency (Rl1 - Rl5) found in La Porta et al. [1997].  LO takes the value of 
one if the country has a legal origin rooted in the Common law tradition (zero otherwise).  
We also control for economic characteristics:  Log(GDP/Capita) is gross domestic 
product per capita as reported by the World Bank [2003]; K-Intensity is the average 
capital intensity for a given country defined as the ratio of net fixed assets to sales; Size is 
the average firm size in the country measured as the log of the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt. 
 US sample 
 As proposed by Hovakimian and Hovakimian [2005], we control for size (log of 
Compustat item 6), market-to-book ratio (item 6 plus the product of items 25 and 199 
minus item 60 and item 35, scaled by item 6), ROA (a measure of profitability calculated 
as the ratio of Compustat item 170 divided by item 6), dividend payout ratio (a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if item 21 or 127 is greater than zero, zero otherwise), 
leverage (item 9 scaled by data 9 plus the product of items 25 and 199), Z-score (a 
measure of bankruptcy risk defined as 3.3 times item 170 + item 12 + one fourth of item 
36 plus one half of the difference between item 4 and item 5, scaled by item 6), the 
standard error of CFO, tangibility (a measure of bankruptcy cost defined as the ratio of 
item 8 and item 6), and R&D (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if item 46 is 
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greater than zero, zero otherwise). In addition, we include two measures of financial 
slack, CFOsale (the ratio of CFO divided by item 12) and Slack (the ratio of item 1 and 
item 8).  Finally, we control for auditing quality by including BigSix, a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the firm is audited by a Big Six auditor (data # 159 between 10 
and 89), zero otherwise. Generally, we expect bigger firms, with higher and more stable 
cash flows, more tangible assets and fewer investment opportunities to be less sensitive to 
internally generated cash flows.  We also control for analyst coverage in an untabulated 
robustness check. To measure analyst coverage, we use data obtained from the I/B/E/S 
Historical Summary File. We use AnalCov, the log of the number of analysts (plus one 
since the log of zero is not defined) reported by IBES as covering the firm, as our proxy 
for analyst coverage.  For each year, we set the number of analysts following a firm as 
the maximum number of analysts who make annual earnings forecasts in any month over 
a twelve-month period. We assume that firms not covered by I/B/E/S are not covered by 
analysts. 
 Japanese sample 
 We follow a similar approach in our Japanese sample. Specifically, we use the 
following items from PACAP: log of BAL9 for size; the sum of BAL9 and market value 
minus BAL21 scaled by BAL9 for market-to-book ratio; the sum of INC9, INC8 and 
INC7 scaled by BAL9 for ROA; MKT1 for calculating dividend payout ratio; the ratio of 
BAL14 divided by market value and BAL14 for leverage; 3.3 times the sum of INC9, 
INC8 and INC7 plus INC1 plus 0.25 time BAL20 plus 0.5 times the difference between 
BAL6 and BAL13, scaled by BAL9 for Z-score; the ratio CFO over INC1 for tangibility; 
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the ratio of CFO divided by INC1 for CFOsale; and the ratio of BAL1 scaled by the sum 
of JAF16 through 21 and 23 for Slack. 
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Table 1: Correlations among summary measures1 
 
 AQ CIFAR CR SR JE 
CIFAR 
0.13 
(0.48)     
CR 
-0.17 
(0.33) 
0.04 
(0.83)    
SR 
0.31 
(0.08) 
0.39 
(0.03) 
0.22 
(0.20)   
JE 
-0.16 
(0.37) 
0.44 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.41) 
-0.08 
(0.66) 
 
LO 
0.27 
(0.12) 
0.35 
(0.04) 
0.38 
(0.03) 
0.66 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.55) 
 
1 AQ is a measure of accounting transparency calculated as the sum of Earnings aggressiveness, Loss 
avoidance, Earnings smoothing (Bhattacharya et al. [2003]) and Timeliness (Bushman et al. [2004]).  
CIFAR is based on a disclosure index calculated by the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research.  CR is a summary measure for creditor rights (as reported by La Porta et al. [1997]).  SR is a 
summary measure for shareholder rights (as reported in La Porta et al. [1997]).  JE is a measure of judicial 
efficiency based on the five measures found in La Porta et al. [1997].  LO is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if a country’s legal system has as a Common law origin, zero otherwise (as reported by La 
Porta et al. [1997]).  The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 38 
Table 2:  Investment-cash flow sensitivity – Cross-country sample1 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
 
Dependent Variable:  Investment-cash flow sensitivity  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept ( + ) 0.527 1.725 1.558 1.994 
  
(5.07) (3.66) (3.12) (3.69) 
AQi ( - ) -0.120 -0.141 -0.129 -0.113 
  
(-2.74) (-2.63) (-2.40) (-2.01) 
CIFARi ( - )  -0.014 -0.013 -0.018 
  
 (-2.29) (-1.98) (-2.52) 
JEi ( - )  -0.008 -0.010 -0.016 
  
 (-0.63) (-0.81) (-1.19) 
CRi ( - )  -0.089 -0.071 -0.069 
  
 (-2.48) (-1.96) (-1.88) 
SRi ( - )  0.038 0.056 0.075 
  
 (0.92) (1.24) (1.52) 
LOi ( - )   -0.126 -0.207 
 
 
 
 (-1.33) (-1.86) 
Log(GDP/capita) ( - )    -0.000 
 
 
 
  (-1.37) 
K-Intensity ( - )    0.002 
 
 
 
  (0.06) 
Size ( - )    -0.030 
  
 
  (-3.39) 
Number of 
observations  34 33 33 33 
R-square  13.96% 42.05% 43.94% 55.32% 
 
1 AQ is a measure of accounting transparency calculated as the sum of Earnings aggressiveness, Loss 
avoidance, Earnings smoothing (Bhattacharya et al. [2003]) and Timeliness (Bushman et al. [2004]).  
CIFAR is based on a disclosure index calculated by the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research.  JE is a measure of judicial efficiency based on the five measures found in La Porta et al. [1997].  
CR is a summary measure for creditor rights (as reported by La Porta et al. [1997]).  SR is a summary 
measure for shareholder rights (as reported by La Porta et al. [1997]).  LO is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if a country’s legal system has as a Common law origin, zero otherwise (as reported by La 
Porta et al. [1997]).  Log(GDP/Capita) is gross domestic product per capita.  K-Intensity is the average 
capital intensity for a given country defined as the ratio of net fixed assets to sales.  Size is the average 
firm size in the country.  Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares.  The t-statistics with 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 3:  Investment-cash flow sensitivity – US sample1 
 
Variable Dependent Variable:  Investment-cash flow sensitivity  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
AQFS -2.48 -1.624 -27.57 
 (-9.17) (-6.24) (-10.26) 
BigSix  -0.111 -0.17 
  (-2.41) (0.43) 
LogAsset  -0.028 -0.559 
  (-6.85) (-9.48) 
Mkt-to-Book  0.048 1.257 
  (5.92) (11.76) 
ROA  -0.434 -6.124 
  (-3.92) (-5.88) 
σ(CFO)  0.639 11.916 
  (5.18) (12.14) 
Z-score  -0.029 -0.401 
  (-2.46) (-2.91) 
Tangibility  0.131 3.209 
  (3.18) (5.45) 
R&D  0.000 -0.043 
  (0.03) (-0.22) 
K-structure  -0.036 1.33 
  (-1.09) (3.59) 
Mean K-structure  0.225 1.129 
  (3.47) (1.03) 
CFOsale  -13.717 -48.145 
  (-3.72) (-1.60) 
Slack  0.016 0.272 
  (1.73) (5.03) 
Dividend  0.010 0.395 
  (0.67) (2.64) 
Number of observations 28,353 28,353 12,420 
R-square 68.24% 70.10%  
 
1 The dependent variable is a measure of cash flow sensitivity as defined by Hovakimian and Hovakimian 
[2005].  AQFS is a measure of accounting quality as defined by Francis et al. [2005].  BigSix is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm is audited by a Big Six auditor (data # 159 between 10 and 
89), zero otherwise.  LogAsset is the log of Compustat item 6.  Mkt-to-Book is item 6 plus the product of 
item 25 and 199 minus item 60 and item 35, scaled by item 6.  ROA is a measure of profitability calculated 
as the ratio of Compustat item 170 divided by item 6.  σ(CFO) is the standard deviation of cash flows from 
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operations.  Z-score is a measure of bankruptcy risk defined as 3.3 times item 170 + item 12 + one fourth of 
item 36 plus one half of the difference between item 4 and item 5, scaled by item 6.  Tangibility is a 
measure of bankruptcy cost defined as the ratio of item 8 and item 6.  R&D is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if item 46 is greater than zero, zero otherwise.  K-structure is item 9 scaled by data 9 plus 
the product of item 25 and 199.  Mean K-structure is the mean of K-structure at the industry level.  Slack 
the ratio of item 1 and item 8.  Dividend is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if item 21 or 127 is 
greater than zero, zero otherwise.  Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using ordinary least squares.  Column 3 
is estimated using a logit specification.  All specifications use firm fixed effects. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
